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RISK ATTITUDES OF RURAL HOUSEHOLDS IN SEMI-ARID
TROPICAL INDIA
Hans P. Binswanger*

INTRODUCTION
This paper reports findings from a sequence of risk attitude experi
ments carried out by the International Crops Research Institute for the
Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) in 250 farmer and landless labor households in
three agroclimatic regions of the Indian Semi-Arid Tropics (SAT). The
risk attitude experiments form a part of a larger research program carried
out by the Economics Program of ICRISAT to assess the effects of risk and
risk aversion on the agriculture of these regions.

The research program

is aimed at testing the hypothesis that the high levels of production risks
in SAT coupled with risk aversion leads to underinvestment into agriculture
by farmers relative to the expected profit maximizing levels. If the hypo
thesis is found to be true, attempts will be made to quantify the invest,
ment gap and to study more carefully the policy alternatives which can be
pursued to reduce the investment gap (if it exists).
Underinvestment could also be induced by credit constraints or more
exactly, very high costs of borrowing. For an area as a whole, such high
credit costs could arise from unwillingness of lenders to lend without
high risk premiums over and above the rate of return in low-risk areas.
This forms an alternative hypothesis to be tested as well.
*Hans P. Binswanger is an Associate of the Agricultural Development Council
presently stationed at the Economic Growth Center of Yale University. The
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics, Hyderabad,
India, supported the research on which this paper is based. I would like
to thank J.G. Ryan, M. von Oppen and Monique Binswanger for valuable ideas
during the methodology design stage and similarly thank B.C. Barah, R.D.
Ghodake, S.S. Badhe, M.J. Bhende, V. Bhaskar Rao, T. Balaramaiah, N.B.
Dudhane, Rekha Gaiki, K.G. Kshirsagar, Madhu Nath, Usha Rani and S. Valasayya
for their patience in carrying out the experiments and computations. Jock R.
Anderson and Gary Fields made helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
paper.
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To establish that risk and risk aversion -lead to underinvestmen t,
empirical knowledge on-three questions is required.
First, of course, investment in semi-arid tropical agriculture must
be risky. This riskiness is a well known fact and needs no further re
search, except for more precise quantification.

However, to later deal

with development alternatives we must be able to quantify the relative
importance of yield risks in and price risks in total production risks,
the effect of crop diversification on those risks, the relative importance
of drought risk in total yield risks, and the effect of modern inputs
such as high yielding varieties, fertilizers and supplementary irrigation
on the yield risks. A series of projects is.underway to assess these
questions, but results are not yet·available.
Second, riskiness or increases of riskiness with input use will lead
to underinvestmen t only if farmers are risk-averse rather than risk
neutral. Risk-neutral individuals will try to maximize average·or
expected net returns r~gardless of the extent of variability in these re
turns. This is also a strategy which leads to the highest returns on
investment in the long run.

On the other hand, a risk-averse individual

will forego some expected returns if this also reduces the extent of
variability of _his income stream. Thus he will underinvest relative to
the risk-neutral or social_ly optimal level. The question is whether the
overwhelming majority of farmers in the SAT are risk averse. Also neces
sary is the quantification of the extent of pure risk av~rsion of farmers
and landless laborers and the relation of risk aversion with the riskiness
of agriculture of the region, the size of the farm and the size of the
investment to be undertaken. 1
Third, it is important to realize that underinvestmen t need not neces
sarily occur if agriculture is risky and if farmers are risk-averse. If
they have effective mechanisms at their disposal for self insurance or
risk diffusion, they may still invest up to the risk-neutral optimum. For
example, an effective crop insurance system would allow farmers to shift
the risks to the insurance system as a whole, i.e., risk would be diffused
over wider areas and across years.

Such systems do not exist at present

and farmers have to largely rely on their own means for self insurance and
(
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risk diffusion.

We distinguish two types of adjustment measures:

Risk-reducing measures are used before damage may occur and include crop
diversification, intraseasonal adjustment of sowing times and cropping
patterns, soil and water management techniques, etc.

Loss-management or

risk-diffusion measures are designed to deal with the consequences of
losses and include storage, salvage, operations, buildup of financial
assets, reduction of financial commitments in drought years, borrowings
and many more.

They are aimed at risk diffusion over time, space and

across individuals.

Efficient devices for risk reduction and loss

management would allow a farmer to take substantial levels of risk
without being exposed to severe reductions in his customary consumption
or without loss of productive assets even in drought years.

If, as

Morris Davies Morris reasons, these risk-reducing and risk-diffusing
measures are costless or nearly so, we are in a situation analogous to
perfect insurance and no underinvestment would occur. However, if these
measures have a very high cost, and if cheaper and more effective measures
could be designed or the existing ones made more effective by public
policy, then risk aversion would clearly lead to underinvestment.

At the

present stage, research at ICRISAT--carried out by Narpat s. Jodha (1977-b)
and. reported in a companion paper--demonstrates that famers' own mecha
nisms for loss management or risk diffusion are very expensive in arid
and semi-arid regions.

This is contrary to our initial expectations.

Together with the key conclusion of the present paper, that the over
whelming majority of farmers are indeed risk-averse, it forces us to
start doing research into the cost effectiveness of public policy measures
aimed at replacing or strengthening farmers' own adjustment mechanisms,
and it further implies that quantification of the underinvestment induced
by risk becomes crucial.
THE METHODOLOGY
In this paper only pure risk attitudes of farmers and landless
laborers are considered.

We need to know the proportions of the popula

tion which are risk-neutral, mildly risk-averse or severely risk-averse.
Furthermore, we want to test the following hypotheses.
- Does risk aversion increase with the size of investment?
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- Are poor people more risk-averse than rich ones?
- Are people in risky areas more risk-averse than in assured areas?
- Are progressive farmers less risk-averse than average farmers?
Accepting any of these hypotheses would strengthen the case for dif
ferentiated policies to deal with risk according to the size of invest
ments considered in the case of the first hypothesis; according to income
or asset class in the case of the second hypothesis; according to riski
ness of the zone for the third hypothesis; or according to the level of
progressivenss in the case of the fourth hypothesis.
Previous attempts to measure risk attitudes among farmers have usually
been based on interviews. 2

The interview techniques typically consist of

presenting to the farmer an uncertain prospect, in which he would receive
Rs.1000 with 50% probability and 'O' rupees with 50% probability. The
individual is theri asked to state the minimum fixed or sure amount of
money for which he would give up or sell the uncertain prospect. If that
is Rs.500 (the expected value of the uncertain prospect) he is considered
risk-neutral; if it is less, he is risk-averse and he prefers risk if the
sure amount desired is more than the expected value.
In the ICRISAT village level studies a irariation of this method was
used on all 240 household heads. The variation was based on Scandizzo
and Dillon's (1976) work in Brazil and consisted in expressing sure and
uncertain prospects in terms of net returns from wet land versus those of
dry land (or from daily labor versus long term contracts for laborers).
Considerable care was thus taken to make the question meaningful.in terms
of the respondents' own experience.

Substantial pretesting of the

schedules and training of the already very experienced investigators was
done prior to the full study.
Inconsistencies in the answers obtained in neighboring villages, how
ever, cast doubt on the reliability of this methodology.

In five of the

six villages the survey was repeated, switching investigators partially
or fully for the second round. This check indicated that the interview
method is subject to substantial investigator bias, although at least
certain patterns appeared stable across interviews.

Nevertheless, there

was no way of judging the reliability of these apparently stable patterns

5

and a new methodology was designed.

Furthermore, it appeared that the

measured risk attitudes were confounded with other attitudes such as
leisure preferences, preferences for certain traditional occupations and
learning difficulties of the respondents, many of whom are illiterate.
The effort was thus abandoned and a new methodology developed.
The basic difference of the new methodology is that real choices
are observed instead of hypothetical questions.

A second important dif

ference is that a sequence of choices is observed over a period of about
six weeks during which the tested persons can reflect on their choices.
Agricultural decisions are not made on the spur of the moment without
much reflection and under imagined or real time pressure from an inter
viewer who has other work as well.

The new method thus is closer to the

decision process in agriculture than the interview methods.
The method can best be explained using Figure 1.
ntmlbers in the lower corner.

The respondent

between the alternatives Oto F.

Consider first the

is asked to make a choice

If he chooses alternative F, a coin is

tossed and he is given O rupees if head falls and 200 Rs. if tail falls.

3

Note that at worst the indixfdual does not win anything; he cannot lose
any money.

This is an important property of method.

Most people have

shied away from gambling to elicit attitudes towards risk because of moral
problems involved when poor people are asked to put their own money at
risk.

This is not the case here.

If the individual chooses alternative C,

he gets 30 Rs. on head and 150 Rs. on tail.

If he chooses

o,

he gets '50 Rs.

regardless of how the coin falls, i.e., 0 is a riskless choice.

In the

context of individuals who are as poor as small farmers or landless la
borers, it is also important to first give them the money to play with:
otherwise the mere fact that they may have no cash at hand prevents them
from exercising certain choices.

But the goal of this experiment is pre

cisely to distinguish between real risk aversion and behavior which looks
4
like risk aversion but in fact is induced by cash or credit constraints.
Graphically the alternatives can be presented in terms of their ex
pected return and standard deviation (Figure 1).

Alternative O has ex

pected returns of 50 Rs. and zero standard deviation.

In shifting from

0 to A, expected returns increase to 70 while the SD goes to 25.

Ex

pected returns continue to rise by 10 Rs. in going to B, C and E, but each
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time a larger increase in SD is necessary to buy that increase in expected
return. Moving from E to F implies no gain in expected return but an
increased variability.

Only a totally risk-neutral individual or a risk

preferer would take this step.

Finally, alternative Dis introduced to
test whether individuals can detect stochastic dominance. 5 Dis stochas
tically dominated by C which has the same expected return but lower

standard deviation.

No risk-averse individual would choose it.

And a

risk-neutral individual or one who prefers risk should choose E or F over
6
D.
However, this is not easily apparent if one looks only at the numbers
under head and tail. 7
One way in which one can measure attitudes to risk is simply by
looking at the slope of the lines connecting the alternatives. The
steeper the slope, the higher the risk aversion.
individuals is the following:

The basis for grouping

If you choose B, for example, you must pre

fer it to A or C, or at best you do not care, i.e., are indifferent
between A and B or Band c. An indifference curve between expected return
and standard deviation must go either through point B or, as I does, be
1
approximately tangent to the line segments AB or B c. 8 Its slope g, which
measures risk aversion, must be between 0.5 and 0.66. If you choose E, it
must be between g=0.00 and g.Q.33.

Instead of keeping these numbers in

mind I have associated with each choice a name categorizing the chooser.
In another paper I will discuss the methodology, its development and
its testing in more detail. I will also place it more precisely relative
to other choice theoretic frameworks.

The most important of these is the

von Neumann-Morgenston theory which is based on utility functions in terms
of wealth. We can relate the devices of this game to this theory via
the concept of partial risk aversion P introduced by Menezes and Hanson,
1970 and Zeckhauser and Keeler, 1970 (who call it size-of-risk aversion).
Partial risk aversion is defined as follows:

let u(W)

be the utility

function of Wealth Wand u' and u" its first and second derivative.
Let M be a certain income (or the certainty equivalent of any uncertain
prospect). Then
t

P(W + M) = -M u"(W + M)/u'(W + M)
Absolute risk aversion (when measured at the sum of certain income plus
the certainty equivalent of the game) is
A(W + M) = -u"(W + M)/u' (W + M)
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Therefore risk aversion Pis simply a multiple of A. 9
Given the game payoffs we can estimate A by a quadratic approxima tion of
the utility function 10 and from there estimate P.
Bounds on the value of P implied by the choices:
Choice

Lower Bound

F

-oo

E

0

UEEer Bound
0
.346

C

.346

.647

B

.647

1.088

A

1.088

1.951

0

1.951

5.0

Note furthermo re that both g and Pare unaffecte d by multiplic ative
transform ations of the payoffs of the game (say divide all the amounts
by 10 or 100).

We can thus test the hypothesi s of increasin g partial
risk aversion (Zeckhaus er and Keeler, 1970) by testing whether indivi

duals choose alternati ves O, A and B with higher frequency at the higher
multiples of the game payoffs. 11
Finally, note that the sets of alternati ves measure attitudes towards
risk in a quite intuitive way, independe ntly of any specific theory of
behavior under risk.

However, transfer of the coefficie nts of risk
aversion to choices other than the ones presented here does require a
specific theoretic al formulati on of choice under uncertain ty. 12 The risk
attitude experimen t is rich in conclusio ns which improve our discrimin ating
ability among alternati ve theories. These will, however, not be discussed
in this paper.
The individua ls are not allowed to choose immediate ly at the level of
payoffs on Figure 1, which is called the 50 Rs. level. Instead, all pay
offs under Head and Tail are divided by 100, s~ that the extreme risk
averter gets 0.50 Rs. while the moderatel y risk-aver se individua l gets
0.30 Rs. or 1.50 Rs., depending on the outcome of the toss. The game is
then played 5 times at this 0.50 level, each time paying out the gains to
teach the game to the often illiterat e individua ls and convince them that
they would really be paid!
for reflectio n.

Between each game at least one day is left
Photograp hs of coins showing the amounts to be paid help

9

the illiterate individuals to study the game payoffs for themselves.
We handed out forms and photographs with the payoff structures on the first
day of the game sequence to all participants who kept them at home to
study and discuss with whomever they wanted.
The full sequence of questions and games is given in Table 1.

Thus

we next ask the individuals to indicate a hypothetical choice at the
50 Rs. level, i.e., we tell them that they will not receive the money
but have to answer the question.
We then play the game at the 5 Rs. level, i.e., dividing all amounts
in Figure 1 by 10.

To simulate a real decision as if the individual's

own money was involved we then give each individual 5 Rs.
day he can keep the 5 Rs. or come back and play.

On the next

But then he must put the

amount which his choice puts at risk on the table; he thus puts money at
risk which he already owned for a full day.

The risk aversion distribu

tions found in the two 5 Rs. rounds do not differ statistically.

This

indicates that the methodology does do what it was intended to achieve:
After playing the game several times at low payoffs, individuals come to
regard the amounts offered for sure as their own money and play with it
in this particular way.
Two weeks later we really play at the 50 Rs. level, but precede the
game by a hypothetical question at the 500 Rs. level, i.e., multiplying
the amounts by 10 again.

The objective of the 2 hypothetical 50 Rs.

question was to test the reliability of answers to hypothetical questions
in the context of this game.

If the answers to "50 Rs. Hypothetical" and

"50 Real" do not differ too much, we may infer that the answers to 500
hypothetical are reliable as well.

If this is the case, we get an answer

at quite high payoffs without paying money.

Playing the 500 Rs. game with

100 households would cost nearly 100,000 Rs., which is expensive.

Right

after the 50 Rs. real game, a hypothetical 50 Rs. question is asked to
test the innnediate impact of loss or gain on risk attitudes.
The methodological conclusions from the hypothetical questions are
discussed in detail elsewhere.

They indicate that hypothetical questions,

when asked for the first time, differ in a statistically significant way
from real choices but they come closer to the observed choices as the
game and questioning process advances.

In hypothetical questions many

10

Table 1.

GAME N0.

1

Sequence of Games

MINIMUM DELAY

GAME LEVEL IN RS.

1

FIRST DAY

a.so

2

ONE DAY

0.50 Real

3

ONE DAY

o.so

Real

4

ONE DAY

a.so

Real

5

ONE DAY

a.so

Real

6

ONE DAY

7

SAME DAY

Real

50 Hypothetical
5 Real

SAME DAY

Hand out 5.00 for
next day Game

8

ONE DAY

50 Hypothetical

9

SAME DAY

5 Real
500 Hypothetical

11

TWO WEEKS

12

SAME DAY

50 Real

13

RIGHT AFTER

50 Hypothetical

16

TWO WEEKS

500 Hypothetical

17

SAME DAY

50 Hypothetical

1

Game Nos. 10, 14 and 15 are missing from this table.
were only played in certain villages.

They

11
people initially like to project either a more risk-neutral or a more
risk-averse behavior than they actually choose depending on whether they
believe that ideal behavior courageously faces up to risks or consists
of being cautious in all circumstances.

However, the hypothetical answers

tend to coincide statistically with the real choices after playing at the
50 Rs. level once.

On the basis of these conclusions this paper presents

only evidence for the real choices, except that the results from the
second hypothetical 500 Rs. game (no. 16) are also reported.

Table 1

shows the sequence of games which were played with about 125 households,
i.e., one village in each of the three regions considered.

The sequence

of games was set up in this way so that the methodology could be rigorously
tested for its replicability and reliability at the same time as the con
clusions were derived.

All of these tests strongly support the reliabi

lity of the method.
For the 125 households in the other three villages the sequence was
cut short after the second 5 Rs. game to save costs.

Statistical tests

indicate that there are some differences among villages at the 5 Rs. level,
but that they disappear at the 50 Rs. level.

We can therefore expect

that there would be little difference in conclusions if the 50 Rs. game
13
had been played in all the villages.
Finally, in two villages, or about 80 households, the game was
played up to the 5 Rs. level with both household heads (of which 8 were
females) and the next most important female in the house.

Usually the

most important female was the wife of the household head.

Where no wife

was present it was a daughter, sister or mother.
The 0.50 Rs. games were played with the respondents by six resident
male and three visiting female investigators.

The 5 Rs. level games were

played by two ICRISAT scientists and myself and all 50 Rs. games were
14
played by me.
The total amount of money paid out in the experiment was
approximately Rs.20000.00.

For households included in the 50 Rs. same the

average return was approximately Rs.110.00 which exceeded monthly income
for many households.
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THE AREAS AND THE SAMPLES
The ICRISAT Village Level Studies consist of two purposely selected
villages each in three purposely selected districts of the semi-arid
tropics. Table 2 gives the characteris tics of the villages. 15 The most
important characteris tics to be kept in mind are as follows:
Sholapur (Shirapur and Kalman villages) is a medium to deep black
soil (Vertisol) area with uncertain rainfall distributio n. It is a high
risk area growing mainly Rabi (postmonsoo n) sorghum. The region had
experienced a three year drought from 1971-72 to 1973-74, the effects of
which farmers are still to overcome. Akola district (Kanzara and Kinkheda)
is a medium black soil area witl:',:,,,,_assured rainfall. Agricultura lly it is
the most prosperous tract although incomes per capita may not be much
higher due to higher population density.
Mahboobnaga r district (Aurepalle and Dokur) is a shallow to medium
red soils (Alfisol) area with less erratic rainfall than Sholapur. Never
theless, agriculture without irrigation is at least as risky because of
the low moisture holding capacity of the soils. Aurepalle has very little
irrigation while Dokur has several tanks and many wells which irrigate
38% of the total cropped area. Dokur is therefore less subject to risk
than Aurepalle.
Within each village a stratified random sample with 30 farmers and
10 landless laborers was chosen. Farmers fall into three size groups with
10 farmers in each. This is called the "Household Head" sample • . The
wives (or the next important female) in each household were also in~luded
in the experiments in Kinkheda village of Akola and Dokur village of
Mahboobnag ar.

For short we call it the "wives sample." In all villages,
except Shirapur (Sholapur) an additional three farmers were included in
the experiments . They were the three most progressive farmers in the
villages, with the choice left to the resident investigato rs. Progressive 
ness was defined as early adoption of new production practices and care
fulness of farming in general. In some villages the progressive farmers
included some of the village officials. Results for this group are re
ported separately as "progressiv e farmers I."
Since there are only 14 such "most progressive " farmers, the resident
investigato rs of the villagers were also asked to identify, from within
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Table 2.

Characteristics of the Study Villages and Areas

AK.OLA

SHOLAPUR

MAHBOOBNAGAR

District:
Village:

Aurepalle

Dokur

Shirapur

Kalman

Kinkheda

Kanzara

1. Population
(No/Sq.km)

167

100

110

93

133

156

2. No. of
households

476

313

297

423

143

169

3. Landless
households
(%)

27.52

13.10

23.56

24.ll

40.56

32.54

1.47

7.03

14.82

26.00

1.40

2.95

71.01

79.87

61.62

49.89

58.04

64.50

3.53

2.62

6.53

7.97

5.76

6.10

12.04

32.28

8.23

9.19

0.93

4.45

8. Average rainfall (at Taluka
681.48
Hq. in mm.)

762.00

635.80

659.70

818.80

818.80

Medium
Alfisol
Gravelly

Deep
Vertisol
Medium
deep
Vertisol

Medium
deep
Vertisol
Deep
Vertisol

Medium
Deep
Vertisol

Medium
Deep
Vertisol

Paddy
Groundnut
Sorghum
Pigeonpea
Castor

RabiSorghum
Pigeonpea
Chickpea
Wheat
Minor
Pulses

RabiSorghum
Pigeonpea
Chickpea
Wheat
Minor
Pulses

Cotton
Sorghum
Mungbean
Groundnut
Wheat

Cotton
Sorghum
Mungbean
Groundnut
Wheat

4. Landowners
who leased out
total land (%)
5. Land Operators (%)
6. Average size

of Operational
Holding (ha)
7. % Irrigable
area to total
cropped area

9. Soil Types

Deep
Alfisol

10. Important
crops of the
Sorghum
village
Castor
Pearl
Millet
Paddy
Pigeonpea

14
the random sample, the 5 most progressive farmers. This group is pooled
with the "progressive farmer I" sample to form a "progressive farmer II"
sample containing about 45 individuals.
Note that in the following tables, sample number may vary slightly
from village to village for the same games. This is caused by temporary
absences of some of the respondents from the villages during the experi
mental sequence.
RESULTS
The basic results on risk aversion distribution is indicated in
Table 3 by the choices in the 50 Rs. game. There is a large concentration
of households in the intermediate and moderate, risk aversion class con
taining 34.8 and 39.8 percent of the respondents respectively. The
intermediate and moderate risk aversion classes correspond to risk aver
sion coefficients~ of 0.33 to 0.66 in a Oto 1 scale (partial
aversion coefficient lies between 0.346 and 1.088). This finding con
trasts sharply with the evidence of Pasquale Scandizzo and John Dillon
which is based on interviews.

They identified substantial proportions of
individuals in the neutral to negative or the extreme to severe classes. 16

In our evidence, at the 50 Rs. level, there are just 10% of risk-neutral
or risk-preferring individuals. The proportion of individuals with severe
or extreme risk aversion is equally small. There are also close to 10%
of the households which are not able to detect stochastic dominance and
choose the risk-inefficien t alternative D.
%

Increasing partial risk aversion:

The concept of increasing partial risk
aversion (Zeckhauser and Keeler) means the following: An individual faced
with the unfavorable prospect of losing an amount X with probability P
would be willing to pay an increasing proportion of X as insurance against
the loss of X as the size of the loss increases. Conversely, for favorable
games of the sort discussed here, it means that the certainty equivalent
of each alternative would be a declining proportion of the expected value
of the alternative as the scale of the game increases. Increasing -s-1:z-e
partial aversion is confirmed if the proportion of respondents choosing
the alternative o, A and B rises as the scale of the game rises. 17
At the 0.50 Rs. level more than one-third of the households are

Table 3.

Payoff Level
& Game Number

Extreme

The Effect of Payoff Size on Distribution of Risk Aversion

Severe

Intermediate

Household Heads:
A 0.50
No. 2

Moderate

Slight
to
Neutral

Neutral
to
Negative

Inefficient

Sample
Size

ShiraEur 2 Kanzara 2 AureEalle

1.7

5.9

28.5

20.2

15.1

18.5

10.1

119

1. 7

8.1

14.5

29.3

21.3

16.6

8.5

235

0.9

8.5

25.6

36.8

12.0

8.5

7.7

117

D 50
No. 12

2.5

5.1

34.8.

39.8

6.8

1.7

9.3

118

E 500 H
No. 16

2.5

13.6

51.7

28.8

0

0.9

2.5

118

B 0.50
No. 4 + 5
C 5
No. 7

All Household Heads
F

0.50
Games 2 + 3

1.7

7.6

18.5

22.7

17.1

18. 7

13.7

475

G 0.50
Games 4 + 5

0.9

8.2

12.9

27.5

22.8

18.4

8.3

473

5.00
Games 7 + 9

0.8

8.1

23.8

36.5

11.9

9.8

9.1

471

H

Distributions tested
A vs
C vs
A vs
B vs
D VS
A vs
F vs
G vs

C vs D
D vs E
C
D
E
B
G
H

VS

E

CHI-SQR

dF

85.68
48.49
11.91
44.22
23.46
13.17
16.30
50.02

18
12
6
6
6
6
6
6

2
xo.05
28.87
21.03
12.59
12.59
12.59
12.59
12.59
12.59

t-'
V,
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observed in the two slight to neutral or neutral to preferred classes
combined.

That proportion drops to 22% at the 5 Rs. level and to 85%

at the 50 Rs. level.

On the other hand, people who initially exhibit

intermediate to moderate risk aversion at the 0.50 Rs. level do not
exhibit increasing partial risk aversion to any marked extent.

In fact

the proportion of individuals in the extreme and severe risk aversion
classes combined varies between 7.6 and 9.8% for the 0.50 to 50 Rs. level.
Only at the 500 Rs. level does it reach 16.1%.

There is also a clear

indication that at the end of the game sequence projection of a risk18
neutral image has stopped.
Out of 118 individuals only one says that
he would make a risk-neutral choice.

Having been asked hypothetical

questions so many times and having them compared later with their own
real choices has given the participants a better introspective capacity.
On the basis of this we can have a substantial degree of confidence in
the 500 Rs. level hypothetical answers, although the evidence is no
doubt more open to challenge than if the game had actually been played.
The hypothetical 500 Rs. answer implies a continued trend towards
higher degrees of partial risk aversion:
the intermediate level.

51.7% of individuals opt for

Severe risk aversion increases slightly, but it

appears that the choice corresponding to extreme risk aversion remains
unattractive even at high levels of games.

For agricultural investments

of consequence we can therefore state that the majority of farmers have
risk aversion coefficients ranging from 0.33 to 0.66 (or from 0.346 to
1.088 for the partial aversion P).

The concentration of individuals in

these two classes is remarkable.
The proportion of severely risk-averse individuals rises to 13.6%
in the 500 hypothetical question.
cautious image.
to 51.7%.

Some of this may be projecting a

But note the rise of the intermediate category from 34.8

Clearly many more people have shifted from the moderate to

intermediate category than from the intermediate to severe.

But people

who always choose intermediate or moderate both in hypothetical and real
situations do not try to project in hypothetical situations.

Therefore

the more pronounced shift from moderate to intermediate than intermediate
to severe would indicate that there continues to exist a real increase in
partial aversion between the 50 Rs. and the 500 Rs. level.

One may there

fore expect that as payoffs rise further the in~ermediate category would

17
tend to absorb an even higher proportion of the individuals than the
51.7% observed at the 500 Rs. level.
In the second panel of Table 3 results for the 0.50 Rs. and the 5 Rs.
level are shown for the full random sample. They are consistent with the
results from the sample of those individuals who played the full sequence.
The differences in the distribution of risk aversion at different
game payoff levels are statistically significant. The simultaneous test
of equality of risk aversion distribution at all levels (A versus C versus
D versus E) has a chi-square value of 85.68 against a critical value of
28.87 at a 0.05 probability level (see table footnotes).
Differences across asset groups:

In Table 4 the results for the three

villages where the 50 Rs. game was played are tabulated by landholding
size group. Note that in the context of the SAT, holding size is not a
very good indicator of differences in access to productive power in the form
of land, because t.1e proportion of irrigated land differs widely from house
hold to household. It is even less reliable as an indicator of total in
come or net worth, which are further confounded with labor income, income
transfers and levels of indebtedness. Nevertheless, farm size is corre
lated with income and asset holding. Work is in progress to reclassify
the households by income and/or asset groups and to analyze the data by
multiple regression analysis to get at the determinants of risk aversion
such as age, dependency ratios, asset class, education and caste. But for
the moment farm size groupings must do.

If we look at Table 4 we find that

there are some differences in risk attitudes at the 0.50 Rs. level. But
they are not statistically significant at the 0.05 probability level,
although the chi-square value of 23.98 is fairly close to the critical
value of 28.87. Among the landless laborers, 27.5% fall into the two
least risk-averse classes. This proportion rises to 36.7% for the small
farmers, 38.3% for the medium farmers and 49.2% for the large farmers.
Similarly the fraction falling into the two most risk-averse classes is
larger for landless laborers and small farmers than for medium and large
ones. Given the fact that the landholding size groups are imperfect
proxies for asset groups, it is reasonable to assume that at this payoff
level wealth does influence attitudes towards risk significantly.

Table 4.

Landholding
Class

The Distribution of Risk Aversion for Different Landholding Classes

Extreme

Severe

Intermediate

Moderate

Slight
or
Neutral

Neutral
or
Negative

Inefficient

Sample
Size

0.5 Rs. 1 Games 4 & 5
A Landless

0

13.8

20.7

27.6

17.2

10.3

10.4

58

Small

0

13.3

16.7

25.0

25.0

11. 7

8.3

60

B

C Medium

3.3

3.3

11.7

35.0

18.3

20.0

8.3

60

D Large

3.5

1.8

8.8

29.8

24.6

24.6

7.0

57

5 Rs. 1 Games 7 & 9
E

Landless

3.5

3.5

39.6

22.4

12.1

6.9

12.0

58

F

Small

0

6.9

20.7

50.0

13.8

1. 7

6.9

58

G Medium

0

6.8

18.6

40.7

20.3

6.8

6.8

59

H Large

0

6.9

22.4

34.5

13.8

10.3

12.1

58

13.7

29

10.0

30

3.3

30

10.3

29

50 Rs. 1 Game 12
I

Landless

6.9

J

Small

10.4

31.0

31.0

3.5

0

6.7

30.0

50.0

3.3

3.5
0

K Medium

3.3

0

40.0

36.7

13.4

3.3

L Large

0

3.5

37.9

41.4

6.9

Distributions tested
At 0.50 Rs.
A vs B vs C vs D
At 5 Rs.
E vs F vs G vs H
At 50 Rs.
I vs J vs K VS L
All villages at 0.50 Rs.
All villages at 5.00 Rs.

0

CHI-SQR (with dF ,. x2 O. OS = 28.87)
23.98
26.28
15.93
40.93
41.81

(detailed tables not shown here)
(detailed tables not shown here)

.....
00
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Considering the 50 Rs. level bet, however, considerabl y dampens this
conclusion. The fraction of household heads falling into the two least
averse classes is 6.9, 3.3 and 6.9 respectivel y for the landless laborers,
small farmers and large farmers. There is thus some slight tendency for
risk aversion to be lower for medium and large farmers combined than for
landless laborers and small farmers combined. But it is most remarkable
that in every asset class the two central risk aversion classes contain
more than 60% of the households, 62% for the landless, 80% for small
farmers, 77% for medium farmers and 79% for the large farmers. Among all
farmers the two central classes contain about 80% of all individuals , re
gardless of size of farm. Thus we must conclude that small, medium and
large farmers have very similar attitudes towards pure risk once payoff
levels are substantial . Landless laborers exhibit slightly more diffuse
attitudes and they are marginally more risk-averse . But the differences
cannot be considered large and they are not statistical ly significant .
The chi-square value is only 15.93 versus a critical value of 28.87.
At the 5 Rs. level the situation is between the 0.50 Rs. and the
50 Rs. level. The distributio n of risk attitudes is more concentrate d
than at the 0.50 Rs. level and less than at the 50 Rs. level. Differences
among size groups are not statistical ly significant . Results for the
sample from all six villages are not shown. For the 0.50 Rs. and 5 Rs.
levels they closely replicate the results from the three villages where
the full sequence was played and are statistical ly significant in both
cases. Thus the larger sample size allows a stronger statistical inference.
These findings imply the following.

People have much more similar

attitudes towards risky prospects when large rather than small payoffs
are concerned and when they are not faced with a budget constraint which
prevents them from even considering a risky prospect. A game between 0
to 2 rupees is carefully considered by landless laborers and poor farmers
for whom daily wages range between 2 and 4 rupees. Nearly half of the
medium and large farmers consider the amounts as so small that they either
prefer to project the risk neutral image, or they may get sufficient en
tertainment from the risky game to be willing to give up a maximum of 0.50
Rs.

As soon as game levels rise, projecting that image or buying the
entertainme nt of gambling becomes much more expensive and only a very few
medium and largJ farmers want to pay the larger price. For agricultura l
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policy what counts is not the behavior at the 0.50 Rs. level but at the
50 Rs. level and higher.

Loans for large and small farmers to make pro

ductive investments usually exceed 50 Rs.

Some policy implications of

the substantial similarities in pure attitudes towards risk will be con
sidered in the last section.
Regional differences:

A frequently advanced hypothesis about the formation

of risk attitudes is that they are influenced by past success or failure.
Our data allow tests.of a long run version of the hypothesis.

The long run

version would imply that individuals who have always lived in highly
risky environments are more risk~averse than those in less risky ones. 19
Table 5 presents the results of this test.
level there are some area differences.

It appears that at the 50 Rs.

Recall that Sholapur is the most

risky area which has recently emerged from a very serious three year
drought, Akola is the least risky area and Mahboobnagar falls in between.
Again the two central classes contain 87.5% of the household heads in
Shirapur (Sholapur), 66.66% in Kanzara (Akola) and 69.23% in Aurepalle
(Mahboobnagar).

Concentration is maintained.

But in Shirapur no one is

close to risk-neutral while Kanzara contains 15.4% of its households in
these two classes and Aurepalle 10%.

Shirapur and Aurepalle have 10% and

7.7% households in the most -risk-averse classes whereas Kanzara only has
5.1% in these groups.

There is therefore a modest difference among the

three villages with the village having had the worst experience behaving
in the most risk-averse manner.

The effect is not strong and not statisti

cally significant.
At the 5 Rs. level the differences are much more marked.

Among vil

lages within the same district a statistically significant difference
exists between Shirapur and Kalman, the former having a more concentrated
and more risk-averse distribution than the latter.

Since they face the

same agroclimate, this cannot be ascribed to the differences in past ex
perience.

On the other hand, the differences between villages in Akola

and Mahboobnagar are not significant.

If the extent of irrigation had an

·effect on attitudes towards risk it should show up as a significant dif
_ference between Aurepalle and Dokur, since the latter has a much higher
level of irrigated area.
no support.

Again the past experience hypothesis receives

It is only when looking at differences among the three areas

Table 5.

Village and
District

Extreme

The Distribution of Risk Aversion for Different Regions

Intermediate

Severe

Moderate

Slight
or
Neutral

Neutral
or
Negative

0

Inefficient

Sample
Size

50 Rs. , Game 12
A Shirapur
Sholapur

2.5

7.5

45.0

42.5

0

B Kanzara
Akola

0

5.1

33.4

33.3

10.3

C Aurepalle
Mahboobnagar

5.i

2.6

25.6

43.6

2.5

40

5.1

12.8

39

10.3

0

12.8

39

5 Rs., Games 7 & 9
D Shirapur
Sholapur

0

3.9

51.3

33.3

6.4

0

5.1

78

Kalman
Sholapur

0

19.2

34.6

25.6

7.7

9.0

3.9

78

Kanzara
Akola

1.3

3.8

9.0

29.5

30.8

14.1

11.5

73

0

2.5

11.2

36.3

16.2

20.0

13.8

80

E

F

G Kinkheda
Akola
H

I

Aurepalle
Mahboobnagar

1.3

10.4

15.6

48.0

7.8

5.2

11.7

77

Dokur
Mahboobnagar

2.5

8.8

21.2

46.3

2.5

10.0

8.7

80

Distributions tested

CHI-SQR

A
A
A
B
D
F
H
D

16.92
11.20
10.27
5.25
18. 54 ]
6.51
4.79
103.54

vs
vs
vs
vs
vs
vs
vs

B vs C
B
C
C
E
G
I
+ E vs F + G vs H + I

3

dF

2
xo.05

12

21.03

6

12.59

6

12.59

12

21.03

N
f-'
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(combining both villages in each area) that the past experience hypothesis
receives some support. A test of Sholapur versus Akola versus Mahboobnagar
has a chi-square value of 103.54 with a critical value of only 21.03.

The

least risky area Akola has the lowest risk aversion and vice versa. The
evidence on area differences is therefore still conflicting but can pos
sibly be resolved by regression analysis. However, it is again clear that
at high levels of bets the marked differences observed at low levels tend
to disappear.
Females:

Table 6 shows some results for the female sample.

At the 5 Rs.

level it is compared with the household head sample of the same villages
(which contains female household heads).

There is a consistent shift of

the female distribution in the direction of more risk aversion relative
to the males.

This shift is not statistically ·significant but the chi

square value of 9.60 relative to a critical value of 12.59 is sufficiently
high to leave the possibility of real differences among the sexes as a
hypothesis which requires further work.

But note again that the two

central groups contain 61.2% of the females and 57.5% of the household
heads.

The central tendency is equally marked for males and females and
while women clearly appear more risk-averse on average, the majority of
women have the same attitudes as the majority of men. Furthermore, com
paring the female sample at the 0.50 Rs. and 5 Rs. level reveals the same
tendency for increasing partial risk aversion as the household head samples.
Progressive Farmers (PF):

In Table 7 results are shown for the 0.50, 5,

and 50 Rs. level for three samples.

The sample PF I are the most progressive

farmers in each village selected on a non-random basis.

The sample PF II

contains in addition the 5 most progressive farmers of the random sample.
At the 0.50 and 5 Rs. level a test was run to see whether the PF I farmers
differ from those of the random sample (PF II minus PF I). The hypothesis
that there was no difference between them could not be rejected (see Table 7
for test results).

Therefore only statistical results are discussed which

compare the PF II sample with the non-progressive random sample from which
the PF farmers were removed.
At the 0.50 and 5 Rs. level progressive farmers appear to be less risk
averse than non-progressive ones.

For example, at the 5 Rs. level 43.4%

of the PF II sample fall into the two least averse classes, whereas these

Table 6.

The Distribution of Risk Aversion of Dependent Females in Kinkheda and Dokur

Extreme

Intermediate

Severe

Moderate

Slight
or
Neutral

Neutral
or
Negative

B

Females

1.9
1.3

9.6

23.1

19.9

0.50 Rs., Games 4 & 5
18.0
26.3

8.3

Sample
Size

~

0.50 Rs., Games 2 & 3
A Females

Inefficient

16.0

8.3

21.2

156

16.0

10.9

19.2

156

5 Rs., Games 7 & 9
Females of:
C

Landless

0

11.1

27.8

41.7

5.5

0

13.9

36

D

Small

0

10.0

15.0

37.5

2.5

20. 0

15.0

40

2.8

11.1

25.0

36.1

8.3

5.6

11.l

36

5.0

27.5

35.0

7.5

5.0

20.0

40

E Medium
F

Large

0

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

G Total
Females

0.7

9.2

23.7

37.5

5.9

7.9

15.1

152

H Total
Males

1.3

5.6

16.3

41.2

9.4

15.0

11.2

160

Distribution tested
A
A
G
C

vs
vs
vs
vs

B
G
H
D vs E vs F

CHI-SQR
3.411
18.02
9.60
19. 66 ·

dF

2
xo.05

6

12.59

18

28.87

N

w

'-

Table 7.

Extreme

A Progres sive I
B

Progres sive II

C Non..:.pr ogressive
random sample
D Progres sive I

Severe

2.6
0.9

7.2

0

F

Non-pro gressive
random sample

1.2

G Progres sive II

0

H Non-pro gressive
;random sample

2 •. 9

9.0

12.8

27.0

23.5

18.6

38.5

13.0

50 Rs., Game 12 2 ShiraEu r, Kanzara , and Aure2al le
5.0
15.0
55.0
15.0
4.8

Distribu tions tested
A vs random sample P-farme rs
D vs random sample P-farme rs
B vs C
E vs F
G vs H

Moderat e

Slight
or
Neutral

5 Rs., Games 7 & 9, All Villages exce2t Shira2u r
7.1
17.9
28.6
21.4
7.9
17.1
27.6
15.8

o.

Progres sive II

Inter'mediate

0.50 Rs., Games 4· & 5, All Villages exce2t Shira2u r
3. 6,
14.3
25.0
14.3
4.0
9.2
18.4
26 .3'

3.6

E

The Distribu tion of Risk Aversion among Progres sive Farmers

37.5

CHI-:-SQR with 6 dF.

I

6.17}
2.81

38.5

x;·_ 05

=

5.8

Neutral
to
. Negative

Inefficient

Sample
Size

32.1

7.1

28

35.5

4.0

76

18.5

10.4

345

25.0

0

28

27.6

4.0

76

9.3

10.4

345

0

10.0

20

8.6

104

i'.9

12. 59

Results for the progres sive farmers of the random
sample not reported separate ly.

16.32
22.91
6.59

N

.i,-
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classes contain only 22.3% of the non-PF random sample.

The differences

are statistically significant at both the 0.50 and 5 Rs. level.
However at the 50 Rs. level, PF and ordinary farmers can no longer be
distinguished statistically, although PF farmers are less risk-averse on
average, which might become statistically significant in larger samples.
But note that the two central risk aversion classes contain 70% of the
PF II sample and 75% of the non-progressive random sample.

There is

nowhere near the sharp difference in risk aversion which would be required
to explain differences in adoption behavior among the two groups on the
basis of difference in their willingness to take risk.

There still may be

differences in ability to do so on account of wealth differences, but these
are differences in the constraint set and not in willingness.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
The results of this research can be stated as follows:

When payoffs

rise to the level of agricultural investments, most people have similar
pure attitudes towards risk.

In all cases considered, at high payoff

levels more than 60% of all households exhibit either intermediate or
moderate risk-aversion.

For farmers, except in Kanzara, the percentage

is between 70% and 80%.

As argued in footnote 7, one can probably classify

those individuals who choose the inefficient alternatives into the same
two groups, which would in general raise that percentage by another 10%
to between 70% and 90% of most farmer groups.

Apart from this overwhelming

central tendency, four conclusions stand out as significant but quantita
tively minor effects:

(1) There exists a slight negative association

between risk aversion and landholding size; (2) Risk aversion in risky·
20
areas is probably somewhat larger than in less risky ones;
(3) Females
are slightly more risk-averse than household heads; (4) Progressive
farmers are only slightly less risk-averse than average farmers at high
payoff levels.
Together with N.S. Jodha's findings (1977-b) on the high cost of loss
management or risk diffusion mechanisms available to farmers, we can safely
accept the hypothesis that risk and risk aversion lead to underinvestment
in semi-arid tropical agriculture.
order.

However, two important caveats are in

First, we do not yet know the quantitative importance of the under

investment.

Further research is needed to assess this.

Second, we now
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know that underinvestment exists relative to a situation where individuals
either are risk-neutral or act as if they were (because they have access
to cheap loss management and risk diffusion devices). However, unless
economic and social policies can design new loss management or risk dif
fusion devices or improve the existing ones so that the "insurance cost"
goes down, our findings are not of much operational significance. If
public risk diffusion mechanisms simply replace the private ones without
reducing their costs, not much is gained. Social science research must
therefore be directed into finding these new or improved mechanisms.
V.M. Dandekar's (1976) work is a significant step in that direction.
After this important qualification of the results, some policy
conclusions still emerge. First, it would not be worthwhile developing
technologies which differ in their riskiness so that small farmers may
adopt the low yield-low risk ones whereas large farmers adopt the high
yield-high risk ones. There is simply not sufficient difference in risk
attitudes among small and large farmers to warrant such an approach. Small
farmers would like to accept the same technologies as large farmers, but
are prevented from doing so by differentially higher costs of credit and
inputs or by other constraints.

Furthermore, techniques to measure dif
ferences in riskiness among technologies are still very complicated and
data intensive, which makes the differential research strategy even less
appealing. One may legitimately search for a "low input optimum" with a
given technology.

For example, in a wheat variety one might e_xplore the
best combination of fertilizers if, instead of an optimal dose of all
fertilizers, one could only afford one-third of the money. Since the low
ranges of production functions are usually the ·ones with highest marginal
returns, pushing small farmers--on account of their higher risk aversion-
towards varieties which do not require fertilizer is not doing them a
service. This is another case in which removal of the disadvantages of
small farmers requires institutional policies aimed at equalizing access
to factor and product markets or to land rather than technology policy.
(For other such cases, see Binswanger and Ryan, 1977).
Second, if it can be shown in other regions that risk attitudes vary
as little across farm size groups as they do in Semi-Arid India, we have to
reconsider in a new light the debate about risk aversion versus credit
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constraint as explanations for low fertilizer use.

If all farmers in a

given area underinvest in fertilizers (relative to the risk-neutral
optimum) this underinvestment is more likely to be caused by risk aversion
than by credit constraints.

The reason is that it is hard to imagine

how a uniform credit constraint across farm size groups could emerge,
whereas rather uniform risk aversion has now been shown in at least the
SAT case.

On the other hand, if fertilizer adoption increases systemati

cally and rapidly with farm size (or other indices of asset holdings) the
underinvestment of small farmers must be caused either by adoption cycle
phenomena such as slower access to information and inputs, or by risk
aversion. If differential fertilizer use persists long after completion of
an adoption cycle, it is most ·likely caused by differential credit or
input costs (or constraints) across farm sizes.
Third, if it can be further firmed up that progressive farmers are
not much less risk-averse than other farmers, then rewards for innovation
are not rewards for superior risk-bearing willingness, as Schumpeter
hypothesized, but are instead returns to superior human capital and su
perior ability to recognize and adjust to new opportunities and constraints
(see Schultz, 1975).

It is unlikely that some intrinsic attitude holds

the less progressive ones back.

It is more likely to be the lack of human

and physical capital.
To close I want to repeat the caution which must be exercised in
pushing these findings towards policy-conclusions.

Underinvestment remains

to be quantified more clearly _and so does the cost of alternative means to
reduce·and diffuse risks in the SAT. Furthermore, some of the conclusions
regarding farm size, geographic, sex.and educational distribution of risk
attitudes require more rigorous testing with regression techniques using
Evidence from other areas, espethe data presented here.
cially less risky or very arid ones, would also help.

Now that a methodo

logy exists which is quite straightforward to apply, such evidence may
hopefully accumulate more rapidly than in the past.
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FOOTNOTES
1
. Note that, even if all farmers were risk-neutral, investment in SAT
areas would have to be lower than in assured zones. In good years, crops

in both zones would yield the same under given management and soil condi
tions, but in the SAT the frequency and severity of negative deviations
from the good year yields is much larger.

Thus, for qny given investment

ievel, the rate of return would be lower, reducing the risk-neutral op ti.
mum investment level.
2
Psychologists have performed experiments, but not with farmers and
usually with small payoffs and small numbers of respondents.
3
At the time of the experiment Rs.100 = US $8.80. W~ge rates for
unskilled female- labor varied around Rs.2.00 and for unskilled male labor
around Rs.3.50 per day.
4

How "risk-averse" behavior is induced by budget constraints or by
imperfection in credit markets is discussed in detail by Robert T. Masson
Samuelson (1977) has also shown that the failure to consider
budget constraints as an important determinant of choice under risk has
been one of the main reasons for the confusion surrounding St. Petersburg
(1972).

paradoxes.
5
one.alternative dominates another stochastically in the second de
gree if it either has a higher expected return for equal standard devia-.
tion, or lower standard deviation and equal expected return, or both
higher expected return and lower standard deviation.

More precise defini

tions can be found in Anderson, (1976).
6 .

. The idea of introduc;i.ng a stochastically dominated alternative came
from the paper by M.J. Gordon et al. (1972).
7

Two different payoff structures were developed.

Payoff structure A

contained the inefficient alternative D of Figure 1, which is derived from
alternative D and has identical expected return. Payoff structure Bis
derived from A by deleting D but adding another alternative D* which gave
20 Rs. and 160 Rs. respectively for head and tail and has equal expected
return than C, but higher variance.

Different households were given

structure A and B to test whether there are positioning effects.

None,
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however, could be found.

It stands to argue that individuals choosing D
and D* have risk attitudes which differ little from those who choose C
and B respectively.

Clearly they are not preferring risk or else they

would choose E or F.
8

The opportunity set of alternative Oto Fis not continuous: individuals cannot combine any two of them to achieve a point such as the
tangency points with 1

or 1 and the slopes of the indifference curve
2
3
along the line segments need not be exactly the same as those of the line
segments.
9
Partial risk aversion is not to be confused with Relative Risk
Aversion, defined by Pratt (1964) as: R(W) = -Wu"(W)/u'(W). Absolute,
Relative and Partial risk aversion are related as follows (Zeckhauser and
Keeler, 1970):
P(M,W) = R(W + M) - WA(W + M)
and once two of these measures are known, the third can be estimated.
10
Higher order approximations make no sense since the distributions
of the game payoffs are all symmetric and higher moments are either zero
or functions of the first and second moment.

If Mis certain income and

Band Care two different game alternatives, indifference between Band
C and quadratic utility curves imply the following equation from which
b, M, A and P can be estimated sequentially for an individual with zero
wealth:
2
u(M) = M + bM = u(B) = E(B) + b[E(B)] 2 + b V(B) = u(C) =
2
E(C) + b[E(C)] + b V(C)
where E denotes the expectation and V the variance of the alternative.

llg and P measures are useful in different contexts.

To use Hazell's

(1971) Motad programming model, g can be used directly. For quadratic
programming, g will have to be transformed into an expected-return -variance
measure.

For most theoretical enquiries, P and other measures of the cur
vature of u(W) are more useful.
12

rn fact it is planned to test the classifications against actual farm
behavior for which data is available in the Village Level Studies.
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There are very minor differences in the sequence of hypothetical

questions in the two villages of the Sholapur area where the game was played
In the other four villages some of the lessons learned in Sholapur

first.

led to changes.

However, they affect mostly the methodological tests per

formed and are of no consequence in this paper.
14 Th

h
·
· d icates
. in
·
once f armers an d 1 a borers un d erstand
tat
e experience

the game and their right for free choice, the personality of the investi
gator can no longer influence these choices, except in the following
If he is impatient he can coax the respondent into making a choice

sense:

quicker than desirable, and if asked again the re.spondent may shift his
answer.

To safeguard against this possibility, for the 5 and 50 Rs.

questions, the respondent's choice was always ascertained by two persons
(one investigator and the investigating scientist) and the process con
tinued till the respondent no longer shifted his answer.
procedure eventually worked remarkably fast.

Note that the

An investigator-scientist

pair could complete one 5 Rs. or 50 Rs. round for 40 households in one day.
This was possible because a majority of individuals came well prepared
since they had time to reflect on their choices.
15

A more thorough description of the areas and the sampling procedures

is given in N.S. Jodha et al., 1977, and Hans P. Binswanger et al., 1977.
16

Scandizzo and Dillon (1976) results are from a sample of 130 farmers

and sharecroppers in Northeastern Brazil.

Since they use outcomes with

skewed distributions, their results are not directly comparable with ours.
Two sharp contradictions can, however, be noted.

In their subsistence

assured case, i.e., at payoff levels much higher than the real income
equivalent of 50 Rs., they find 27.3% of the household heads who prefer
risk, whereas our experimental evidence finds at most 1.7% in this group.
Furthermore, they found 32% of their household heads in their most extreme
risk-averse categories while I find only 2.5%.

In my first risk survey

based on hypothetical question the findings were very similar to theirs.
17

Increasing partial risk aversion is equivalent to increasing relative

risk aversion as hypothesized by Arrow (1971, p. 96) only for individuals
with zero wealth but not for individuals with positive or negative wealth.
Increasing relative risk aversion is not confirmed by this set of experiments.
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s tatistica
· · 1 tests were
.
h h er t h er i s k avers i on
per f orme d to see wet

distribution between the hypothetical and real 50 Rs. answers differed.
It was found that there was a statistically significant difference
betweerrgame no. 6 and 12 but no significant difference could be found
between game 12 and 17.
19Th

· an id enti. f.i cation
.
ere is
pro bl em.

Migration in the present and

past history among areas with different levels of agricultural risks
could have selected individuals or families with less risk aversion in
the risky environments because risk neutrality in the long run is the
growth maximizing strategy. Conversely, more risk-averse individuals or
families would have preferred the more assured zones.
20

B.C. Barah and I are pursuing research on the issue of regional

diversification of policies towards dealing with risk.

That case for

regionally diversified policies will have to rest (a) on differential
risk aversion, (b) on differential riskiness, and (c) on differences in
sources of risk.

(a) emerges here but not strongly, (b) is well docu

mented, and for (c) Barah has preliminary evidence that price risk is
much more important as a source of risk in irrigated areas whereas yield
risk is the most important component of risk in SAT and arid areas. Any
policy aimed at dealing with risk in the irrigated tracts will have to
take account of these differences. There can be little demand for crop
insurance where yield risk is small but price risk is large,·and there
can be little demand for price stabilization where price risk is low and
yield risk is overwhelming. Again these points require more empirical
evidence.
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Erratum

Center Discussion Paper No. 275
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Hans P. Binswanger
January 1978

Page 27, lines 10 and 11:

error:

"risk aversion"

correction:

"credit constraints"

